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Preface
The work described in this report was performed by the Quality Assurance and
Reliability Division of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
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Abstract
This report describes an analysis of in-flight spacecraft part hours and failure data
from the Mariner Mars 1969 Project. It contains failure rates computed from this
data for all electronic and electromagnetic parts on the Mariners 6 and 7 spacecraft.
Also included are failure rates based on combining flight data from Mariners 4, 5, 6,
and 7.
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Failure-Rate Computations Based on Mariner Mars 1969
Spacecraft Data
I. Introduction
The flights of Mariners 6 and 7 offer significant data
concerning the performance and success of electronic and
electromagnetic parts in an interplanetary, long term,
space environment. This report discusses the part-failure
experience for the Mariner Mars 1969 Project. The latter
section of the report combines data from Mariners 4, 5, 6,
and 7 to get larger samples of data to make the computa-
tions statistically more valid. It is intended that the data
summarized and the computed failure rates will be used as
guidelines for failure rates used on trade-off studies and
predictions performed for future Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL) space missions.
II. Brief Description of the Mariner Mars
1969 Project1
The Mariner Mars 1969 Project launched two spacecraft
to Mars. Mariner 6 and Mariner 7 were launched on
February 24 and March 27, 1969, respectively, and flew to
within 3460 km of Mars on July 30 and August 4, 1969.
'From Office of Public Information, JPL.
Each spacecraft weighed 386 kg and was equipped with (1)
a movable platform for mounting TV cameras and other
scientific instruments, (2) a basic octagon structure contain^
ing communication, power, computing and sequencing,
data automation, and propulsion equipment, (3) four panels
with solar cells to provide electrical power, (4) attitude-
control gas jets mounted at the ends of the panels, (5) a
directional dish antenna mounted on top of the octagon,
and (6) an omnidirectional radio antenna.
The scientific instruments on Mariner 6 and Mariner 7
were mounted on the 76-kg movable platform. They were
(1) An infrared radiometer to measure Mars' surface
temperatures.
(2) A wide-angle TV camera.
(3) A narrow-angle TV camera with 25.4-cm telescope
optics.
(4) An ultraviolet spectrometer to measure upper
atmosphere composition.
(5) An infrared spectrometer to measure the composi-
tion of the lower atmosphere of Mars.
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In addition, the radio was used for several science
experiments: the S-band occultation, the celestial mechan-
ics, and the relativity experiments.
III. Basis for the Failure-Rate Derivations
Only flight hours and flight failures were considered in
the failure-rate computations. Whenever failures are
mentioned (prelaunch or postlaunch), these are relevant
failures - where a relevant failure (Ref. 1, p. 1) is a random
part failure occurring after power turn-on during module,
subsystem, and system testing, or flight. Excluded are
failures due to human error or induced by operational
support equipment. Also excluded are failures due to
design errors, mishandling, screening rejections, faulty
external workmanship, and early life failures (under 10 h). In
other words, a relevant failure is considered a random part
failure or noninduced part failure.
Examples of relevant and nonrelevant failures are given
in Refs. 1 and 2.
The equipment operating hours used for the failure-rate
computations take into account those flight subsystems (or
portions thereof) that were nonoperational for portions of
the flight.
Only major part classes are considered. Parts with very
limited part hours (e.g., batteries) are not considered
because the computed failure rates would not have been
meaningful.
The JPL Problem/Failure Reporting (PFR) system was
used to find relevant part failures both prior to and after
launch. When PFR information was sketchy or unclear,
appropriate project or subsystem people were contacted to
obtain necessary background information.
Prelaunch failures and prelaunch operating hours are not
used in the failure-rate computations. The failure rates are
based on flight experience only. Prelaunch failure data is
presented, however, to give indications of the value of
screening and systems testing.
IV. Screening Program
Screening, qualification, and systems testing all contrib-
ute to the removal of early-life- and process-defects-type
failures. JPL has a somewhat unique parts program that
relies on these tests to reduce the probability of inflight
failures. This preconditioning of the parts is illustrated by
considering typical screening tests (Table 1) and typical
qualification tests (Table 2). Tables 3 to 5 indicate Mariner
prelaunch failure experience and Table 6 indicates
postlaunch experience. Table 7 indicates screening yields.
All this indicates that the prelaunch testing is weeding out
many potential flight failures, that is, parts that may have
not reached their constant failure-rate period.
V. Post Launch Mariners 6 and 7 Relevant
Failures
A. Mariner 6
On April 20, 1969, 54 days into the flight, an anomaly
occurred involving the attitude control of the spacecraft.
The failure was an intermittent that appeared again on
May 26, 1969 and on November 11, 1969. The problem
appeared to be in the Canopus cone angle update circuitry.
This failure was later diagnosed to be most probably a relay
failure.
B. Mariner 7
On November 3, 1969, 221 days into the flight, a failure
occurred involving the attitude control. This failure was
probably a relay, and in fact probably the same relay that
failed on Mariner 6. This relay was used in the updating of
the Canopus cone angle. It was not catastrophic to the
mission, as the Canopus tracker was turned off and the
spacecraft placed on roll inertial hold. The spacecraft was
still controlled by the gyros as of the last track before
attitude control gas depleted.
On July 7, 1969, 102 days into the flight, an anomaly
occurred in the central computer and sequencer. The
problem was traced to the Cl source driver in the
computer event matrix. The most probable cause was
deduced to be one of two integrated circuits (1C).
There was also a battery failure, but this is not consid-
ered in this study since a battery is not one of the parts for
which we have sufficient data to compute a failure rate.
VI. Mission Time
For Mariners 6 and 7, the mission times used for failure-
rate computations are from launch to December 1, 1969, at
which time the planned mission was terminated. The
period after December 1 is the extended mission and is not
included in these computations. This gives mission lengths
of 6694 h for Mariner 6 and 5954 h for Mariner 7. In
addition, the encounter science experiments accumulated
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Table 5. Mariner Mars 1969 piece part summary9





























 Represents three flight spacecraft and spares; Ref. 3.










1 1C, 1 relay
a
 Considering the part classes studied in this report.
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aScreening results for JPL furnished parts only. The quantity of parts screened by the subsystem contractors is not represented in
these data; Ref. 3.
59 h between July 29, 01:27:40 and July 31, 12:32:50 on
Mariner 6, and 80 h between August 1, 22:24:01 and
August 5, 06:29:02 on Mariner 7.
The updates of Mariner 4 and Mariner 5 data were based
on the following times: Mariner 4 accumulated 26,832
flight hours between launch (November 28, 1964) and
December 20, 1967, while Manner 5 accumulated 4824
flight hours between launch (June 14, 1967) and January 1,
1968.
VII. Failure-Rate Computations
In all failure-rate computations, raw data (i.e. failures
and part hours) will be included. This will allow readers to
combine Mariner data with their own or other data of
similar background to get larger data samples. If this is
done, care must be exercised to combine only data from
like missions, i.e. missions with similar environments and
whose projects had similar screening programs.2
Computed failure rates for the combined Mariner 6 and
Mariner 7 missions are presented in Table 8. Failure rates
are shown only for general part types, because the data is
too limited to compute useful failure rates for part classes.
Even so, many of the failure rates for some part types are
not meaningful because of too few part hours. They should
be considered only as upper bounds on the "true" failure
rate.
All failure rates have been computed two ways. The
point estimate failure rate is found by dividing the number
of failures by the accumulated part hours, assuming one
failure in the case where none occurred. The 90% upper
confidence level is found using the Chi-Squared distribu-
tion. The meaning of the 90% upper confidence limit can
be seen as follows. Let \u be the computed upper 90%
confidence limit for the failure rate for a particular part
type. Then there is a 90% probability that the "true"
failure rate for this part type is less than Xu and only a 10%
chance that the "true" failure rate could be greater than Xu
VIII. Conclusions
A failure-rate analysis such as this, based on a very
limited number of flight spacecraft, is limited statistically
because of the small sample size involved. This is especially
true of the Mariner 1969 data when considered alone.
When data from Mariners 4 through 7 is combined, the
sample is much larger; however, differences such as parts
program actions, part-type design, and processing varia-
tions result in a more heterogeneous set of data. Obviously,
some of the part types have much fewer part hours than
others. Failure rates based on the small samples do not
pretend to have any validity [e.g., traveling wave tubes
(TWTs) and gyros], but they are presented so that the raw
data might be used by others to combine with their own
data.
Table 9 presents the results of combining data for the
Mariners 4 through 7 missions. These failure rates are
based on a very large amount of part hours and are
statistically the most valuable we can present. The raw data
for these failure rates is presented in the Appendix.
'Screening programs are "similar" only at a gross level; not even all
Mariner Mars 1969 subsystems were screened by programs identical in
details.
Caution must be exercised in applying failure rates to
part types with special differences from the sample parts.
For example, the majority of the 1C failures in Table 5
were due to "purple-plague"-type corrosions in the gold-
aluminum bonds; a feature that is not universal to all 1C
device designs.
The data presented illustrates the effectiveness of the
JPL parts screening program and its subsystem and system
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tests. As was shown by the screening yields, screening did
its share in eliminating defective parts from the program.
Tables 3 through 5 indicate that system testing also found
many part failures. Between screening and systems testing,
most early-life- and process-defect part failures were
removed. This undoubtably contributed to the in-flight
success of the Mariner spacecraft.
Mariners 4 through 7 dramatically proved to be highly
reliable inflight spacecraft. These long-term interplanetary
voyages provide a large data bank of deep-space-environ-
ment part experience. It is hoped that both the failure rates
computed herein, and the raw part-hour data will help to
provide the planners and designers of future deep-space
missions with realistic part failure rates.
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Table 8. Combined flight failure-rate data for Mariners 6 and 7
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Table 8. (contd)
Failure rate,
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Table 8. (contd)












"Note that for the case of no failures,
confidence limit.
268 1,631,251 2 - -
120 671,317 0 - -
388 2,302,568 2. __ 0.8684 2 .^3115
Mechanical
6 1,500 0 666.6666 1535.0000
2 12,648 0 79.0638 . 182.0445
the point estimate is computed assuming one failure. This corresponds to an upper 52%

























Capacitor Diode Resistor Inductor Transformer Relay
165,865,881 242,176,068 410,174,364 5,326,067 12,813,505 4,952,799
0 0 0 0 0 2
0.0060 0.0041 0.0024 0.1877 0.0780 0.4038
0.0138 0.0095 0.0056 0.4323 0.1796 1.0746
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Appendix
Detailed Breakdown of Flight Part Hours for the
Mariners 4 through 7 Missions
When dealing with part classes that have very few part
hours, one must be very careful if one makes failure-rate
computations for these classes. Even if such computations
are prefaced many times over with cautionary remarks
such as "poor upper bound because of limited data",
someone, somewhere,"wilHatch on to the^number,-ignore-
the cautions, and misuse it.
For this reason, failure rates have been computed only
for general part types and not for detailed part classes.
However, since some readers may have further data that
they may wish to combine with the Mariner data, and
others may just wish to know the breakdown, a detailed
breakdown of flight part hours is listed in Table A-l. This
list was arrived at using the projects' parts listings with
variations between projects in their grouping of part types
-and-classes-For example,- Mariner-Mars -1969. considers
wet, solid, and foil tantalum capacitors. I regret that
Mariner 4 data is available only for general part types.
Table 6 lists the flight failure experience for the Mari-
ners.
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Part type 4 5 6 and 7 Total
Electromechanical
Motors — — 139 139
Potentiometers
Composition - 1,112 1,112
Wire-wound - 154,278 154,278
Total potentiometers Tl9,176 155,390 274;566-
aNo part-class breakdown available for Mariner 4.
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